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' MATURE OF FEE CASE
Acti01 is by respondents against appellant for damages on
contracts to provide and erect a pre-cut home, alleging fraud on
del endant ' s ; it i 1 :i t j

I: ,< : f • i ] f :i ,1 ] J: I: u t < :::« >nt t act, ai id a llegincc and

praying for punitive damages.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN THE LOWER COURT
•^ , ^

wer

court ( so far as i s petfcin e n !:::: t: :> thiii s appeal )

enterec j a c c e n t against appellant in the sum of $8000 damages,
and $1=00 punitive damages.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEA L
Ipp e 1 1 ai i t s e ek s r e v e r s a 1 o f t h e j ud gm e n t and dismissal of
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Judgment in this case was also entered against Glen C.
Anderson, Jr., in the sum of $8000 damages and" $2500 punitive
damages; and Anderson also appealed from the judgment.
On May 10, 1976, defendant Glen C. Anderson, Jr.

withdrew

his appeal and the District Court ordered Anderson's appeal
dismissed (Record 377). Hence the only appellant remaining in this
case is Donald A. Mower.
Appellant Mower did not order the transcript, having
insufficient funds (Record 369). Defendant Glen C. Anderson, Jr.
ordered a transcript, but the transcript was never completed and
appeal was dismissed.

Hence, appellant is appealing on the record

minus the transcript and does not intend to rely on the transcript.
Appellant Mower's single point on appeal is that the Complaint
does not state a cause of action as to him and should have been
dismissed.

This point was raised by appellant at every possible

stage in the proceedings below, as follows:
On October 3, 1975, appellant moved the Court for Summary
Judgment and Dismissal of the case on the grounds that "Plaintiffs
have failed to state a cause of action as to defendant, Donald A.
Mower" (Record 162). Hearing was had on said motion before District
Judge Marcellus K. Snow on October 15, 1975.

On October 31, 1975,

the motions were denied (Record 182).
Trial was set for November 3, 1975.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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On October 29, 1975, appellant moved the Court for judgment
on the pleading on the grounds that the complaint did not state
a cause of action against him.

Appellant noticed his motion for

hearing at the trial date (Record 176)• In Points and Authorities
in Support of Motion for Judgment on the pleadings, appellant set
out that he had made a previous Motion to Dismiss before Judge Snow,
and that said Motion was denied; and cited authorities to the effect
that the stated Cause of action is a basic effect that could be made
and renewed at any stage of the case before the trial judge and on
appeal (Record

177, 181).

On November 3, 1975, (day of the trial) the trial judge,
Honorable G. Hal Taylor refused to entertain appellant's motion on
the grounds that the same motion (in essence) had been made before
Judge Snow and had been denied; which decision was binding on
appellant.

Later (appellant recalls) there was read into the

transcript an order denying the motion.
On November 21, 1975, appellant moved for Judgment not withstanding the verdict and Motion for new trial based on the grounds
"that the complaint did not state a cause of action against this
defendant" (appellant Mower).

By minute entry dated December 19,

1975, Judge Taylor denied this motion (Record

335, 352).

-3Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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A R G U M E N T
THE COMPLAINT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS TO APPELLANT
BECAUSE IT FAILED TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST HIM
1.

THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT (R. 1-10)

First Cause of Action:

Respondents allege that on May 2, 193,

they ordered a pre-cut Lindal Cedar Home from Intermountain Cedar
Homes, Inc. "through its agents Donald A. Mower and Intermountain
Cedar Homes, Inc." (para. 3, First Cause).

The complaint then

alleges a shortage of delivery, but the only damage alleged is
against Lindal Cedar Homes, namely, "that the defendant, Lindal
Cedar Homes, failed to deliver part of the items contracted for
and, therefore, owes to the plaintiffs a rebate on the purchase
price in the sum of $2,200.00."
Second Cause of Action:

(para. 4 First Cause)

Respondents allege that on June 14,

1975, plaintiffs contracted with the Intermountain Cedar Homes "by
and through its agent Donald A. Mower" to construct the home.
(para. 2, Second Cause).

They then allege that Intermountain Ceda

Homes failed to complete it to the extent of $3,000.00 and pay for
supplies to the extent of $5,000.00 and therefore, plaintiffs wer
damaged to the extent of $8,000.00. (our emphasis)
Third Cause of Action:

Respondents allege that appellant

Mower "as an agent of Intermountain Cedar Homes" represented to
plaintiffs "that he was an agent and officer of Town & Country
Building Consultants, Inc." and that the latter corporation would
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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in perpetrating the fraud alleged in the Fourth Cause of Action.
2.

THE AUTHORITIES

As mentioned above, the judgment awarded damages for breach
of contract and punitive damages.
The Complaint does not allege a claim against appellant for
breach of contract, nor does it allege a claim of fraud.
Further, punitive damages may not be awarded in breach of
contract actions.
Respecting the allegations against appellant re contract,
iii 3 Am. Jur. 2d Title Agency, p. 564, Section 294, citing nuunerous
authorities, it is stated:
"294. Liability on authorized contracts, generally.
If a contract is made with a known agent acting
within the scope of his authority for a disclosed principal, the contract is that of the principal alone and
the agent cannot be held liable thereon, unless credit
has been given expressly and exclusively to the agent
and it appears that it was clearly his intention to
assume the obligation as a personal liability and that
he has been informed that credit has been extended to
him alone."
f,

The court will notice that there is no allegation that credi
was given expressly or exclusively to appellant Mower and that it
was his intention to personally assume the obligation as a persona
responsibility.
The allegations in the Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action
attempting to allege an action in fraud are woefully insufficient

-6-
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so do*

In 37 Am. Jur. 2d, Title: Fraud and Deceit, Section 60, p. 922,

it is stated:
"60. Generally; rule of nonliability.
"It is a general rule that fraud cannot be
predicated upon statements which are promissory
in their nature at the time they are made and
which relate to future actions or conduct. Thus,
fraud cannot be predicated upon the mere nonperformance of a promise or contractual obligation
or upon failure to fulfill an agreement to do something
at a future time, or to make good subsequent conditions
which have been assured. Such nonperformance alone has
frequently been held not even to constitute evidence
of fraud."
Further, Rule 9(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides "that
the circumstances constituting a fraud shall be stated with
IWtVcHUvi
" In checking citations under the identical Rule of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, we find cases dealing precisely
with respondents1 allegations of fraud.
In Perma Research and Development Company v. The Singer
Company, 410 Federal Reporter, 2d 572 (1969) the Court ruled:
"Allegation that contract was procured
and misrepresentation on part of defendant
agents as to its intentions and ability to
product was by itself plainly insufficient
a claim for fraud. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc.,
28 U.S.C.A."

by fraud
and its
market
to state
Rule 9(b),

In Ivey v. Housing Foundation of America, 73 F. Supp. 201,
(1947) the Court ruled:
"A complaint alleging that plaintiffs, relying
on defendant corporation's representations, paid
specified sum for contract giving plaintiffs right
to act as distributors of corporation's prefabricated houses, and that such corporation falsely
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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represented to plaintiffs that it was able to fulfill
its undertakings to manufacture and deliver such
houses, was insufficient to state cause of action for
fraud."
Further:

When contracts are involved and fraud is claimed,

the party claiming fraud has alternative remedies; namely, sue on
the contract £r the fraud.

The remedies are mutually inconsistent

and a election of remedies must be made.
Fraud and Deceit

See 37 Am. Jur. 2d Title

Sec. 327-328.

It follows, as is stated in White v. Venkowski, 37 Wis. 2d
285, 155 NW 2d 74 (1967):
"Pursuasive authority from other jurisdictions
supports the proposition (without exception) that
punitive damages are not available in breach of
contract actions. This is true even if the breach
as in the instant case is willful."
The failure to state a cause of action is a basic defect.
It can be made and renewed at any stage of the case, before the
trial judge and even on appeal.
In 27 C. J. S. Title: Dismissal & Non-Suit, Section 68, p. 455
it is stated:
"A Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that no
cause of action is set forth may be made at any
time before verdict."
In 27 C.J.S. , Section 70r, p. 460, it states:
"Renewal of Motion: When it does not clearly
appear why the first motion was not allowed it is
no reason why the motion should not be presented
again. It is also been held that such a motion may
be renewed on appeal."

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In Industrial Commission v. Superior Court, 5 Ariz. App. 100
423 P. 2d 375 (1967) the court ruled:
"Denial of motion to dismiss where no cause of
action exists constitutes an assumption of judicial
power not granted by law."
In

Denver Elec. & Neon Serv. Corp. v. Gerald A. Phipps, Inc.

(Colo.) 354 P. 2d 618 (1960) the court ruled:
"Trial Court f s order denying motion to dismiss
certain claims in complaint was subject to modification, and trial court, acting through another
judge, could entertain and grant the motion to
dismiss despite the previous denial of the motion."
See also Grover Irrigation & Land Co. v. Lovella Ditch
Reservoir, 21 Wyo 204, 131 P. 43 (1913) where the court ruled that
objection of a complaint to state a cause of action "may be made
for the first time on appeal."
It is respectfully submitted that the Lower Court's failure
to dismiss the complaint as to appellant was error and its judgment
against appellant should be reversed.
Dated:

July 23, 1976.
Respectfully submitted,

V^SaZ/jO/m
M£A
Attorney for Appellant

9 - J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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